Let me begin by noting that The Philosophy of Motion Pictures, one of the latest in the Blackwell series on the Foundations of the Philosophy of the Arts, is an intriguing monograph, which contains Professor Carroll's latest pronouncements on the major issues in the philosophy of film which have concerned him for over two decades. While I found little to disagree with in the first five chapters, the following critical review will take extensive issue both with Carroll's account of emotional affect in cinema, and with his views on film evaluation.
the list of theorists above suggests, there was no consensus forthcoming about what the singular artistic virtue(s) of cinema were. Even if there was such a consensus, Carroll convincingly argues that '…artists and artworks (are) validly assessed in terms of the excellence of the effects they achieve and not in terms of whether their means of securing those effects are pure. The requirement of purity here seems to fetishize the medium' (47).
Despite his skepticism about the medium specificity thesis, Carroll finds the traditional question 'what is cinema?' to be a compelling one. He offers a careful descriptive definition in chapter three, and proceeds to respond to a raft of counterexamples. Cinema is the practice of making moving images, and '…something is a moving image if and only if 1) it is a detached display…2)… the impression of movement is technically possible; 3) performance tokens of them are generated by templates which are tokens; 4) performance tokens of them are not artworks in their own right; and 5) it is a two-dimensional array' (78). I applaud Carroll's talk about the moving image, which allows us to discuss film, video and digital media without privileging one over the other.
But his resultant definition seems to illustrate a point first made by Morris Weitz in his landmark essay 'The Role of Theory in Aesthetics' 2 : definitions of 'Art' and its subconcepts are essentially evaluative, or, if they aren't, purely descriptive definitions aren't of much use anyway. While conditions 3) and 4) usefully serve to distinguish films from theatrical or dance performances (although I must admit I have never had trouble telling them apart), 1) and 5) seem to state the obvious, while 2) seems a trifle obscure.
Furthermore, couched as his proposal is in terms of traditional 'if and only if' conditionals, Carroll still seems to be operating under the assumption that artistic media like the cinema can be given 'real' definitions in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for the proper application of the term. Like 'Art', the term 'moving image' Shaw, Daniel (2008) The diversity of art forms covered by the concept 'moving image' makes it highly unlikely that any proposed set of necessary and/or sufficient conditions will stand up to all possible counterexamples. Indeed, given the speed at which the various forms of visual media are evolving, the term 'moving image' is particularly wide open.
Chapters 4 and 5 enter into debates about the nature of the shot, the cinematic sequence and the functioning of various forms of cinematic narrative. In the first of these, Carroll rejects the widely held notions that the shot provides us with an illusion of reality, or a transparent representation of the physical world, or a set of codes for us to decode. I agree with his naturalistic recognition thesis, that we do not 'read' a film like a text but rather respond to its perceptual prompts in ways strictly analogous to our responses to the external world.
Carroll continues in this naturalistic vein in arguing against attempts to talk about film as a language, with its own rules of syntax and semantics. Instead, he analyzes how such techniques as variable framing naturally manage our attention by directing it to what is important to the filmmakers: 'Cinematic sequences are built through variable framing , which exploits our natural perceptual predispositions in order to guide our attention to where the motion picture maker wants it to be…' (124). Take the close-up as a simple example: the scale of the image is so great that we cannot help but attend to it in some detail. It's not that we come to recognize, after much experience, that in the language of film, the close-up means that something is important. Rather, we follow our natural perceptual predisposition to take something that big seriously. This is neither a purely arbitrary conclusion nor is it something we need to learn as we acquire fluency in the language of film. The rest of chapter 5 restates Carroll's insightful observation that cinematic narrative is basically erotetic, i.e., that what holds our attention are compelling questions, which are pointedly raised and which closure demands must be answered before the story runs its course (e.g. will Ilsa (Ingrid Bergman) and Rick (Humphrey Bogart) end up together at the conclusion of Casablanca)
While I find much to agree with in these chapters, these seem to be debates in film theory and not particularly philosophical in their nature and scope. Chapters 6 and 7, however, are the most intriguing in the book, as the former explores crucial issues in the calls 'criterial prefocusing' as an alternative to traditional accounts of identification as the major source of our emotional response to cinema. As he put it then, '…emotions in response to fictions (must) be governed by criteria of appropriateness. Thus a film text can be emotively prefocused by being criterially prefocused -that is, by being so structured that the descriptions and depictions of the object of our attention…will activate our subsumption of the relevant characters and events under the categories that are criterially apposite to the emotional state in question…as a result of entertaining the appropriate cognitions, we go through some physical changes' 3 (e.g., we laugh, our skin crawls, we tense up, or may even shed a tear).
This cognitive approach to emotional states leads Carroll to foreground our evaluative judgments (especially moral ones) in accounting for our pro or con attitudes Shaw, Daniel (2008) towards the end of his book: 'We may discover neurons that behave like that in areas associated with emotion, such as the anterior cingulated' (229, n 1).
As Craig Delancey observed in his review of the book for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 6 Prinz resurrects a position that has long been out of favor with both psychologists and philosophers, but is recently enjoying something of a critical renaissance: the 'James-Lange view' that emotions are perceptions of bodily states. On such a view, when we adopt a facial gesture like a grimace while mirroring the expressions of fictional characters, we have a strong tendency to feel emotional distaste as well. It is this natural ability to feel empathy that explains how diverse societies like the United
States of America can function effectively.
More intensely social than monkeys, we are built to be together. We feel each other's predicaments and triumphs at the neurophysiological level. When one looks at a series of happy faces, neurons fire in the area of the brain that registers personal happiness as well. Empathy happens so easily, some scientists now hypothesize, because of the existence of these mirror neurons.
Hence, I contend that Carroll's analysis of the meaning of 'mirror reflexes' and their role in triggering our emotional response to films is simply too cognitive to reflect the present state of neuroscience on the subject. Like his account of horror-pleasure in The
Philosophy of Horror, it places too much emphasis on narrative and moral context and too little on our 'gut reactions' to fictional characters.
Furthermore, the philosopher of mind/psychology to whom Carroll refers several times in the course of his book takes issue with many of the cognitivist assumptions that shape his analysis. Carroll's privileging of what he calls 'criterial prefocusing' over more traditional notions of empathic identification is hence called into question as well. Not only is it likely that we are hardwired to have profoundly empathic responses to our fellow humans (in real life and in fictional situations), but much of the emotional asymmetry that
Carroll remarks upon has to do with differences in knowledge between the character and viewer, or differences between being an active participant and a passive viewer (which would be minimized by mirror neurons). In most cases, were the character to share the same knowledge base as the viewer, their emotional reaction would be similar as well. If Shaw, Daniel (2008) that comes to mind…there is much debate as to whether it is even a genre at all, or simply a style of filmmaking). This, in turn, is crucial to determining whether the work is a particularly good example of the genre or not, which is (to my mind) one of the ultimate goals of aesthetic evaluation.
My point here is that agreement on assigning a film to the appropriate critical category (or categories) can only take us so far in settling evaluative disputes. In the absence of agreement on the defining characteristics of the genre, for example, any two critics are likely to mean something very different by calling a particular film tragic. These differences make a great deal of difference to the ultimate value judgment passed on the work in question, which is the final end of aesthetic evaluation and the crux of most critical disputes that go on amongst the cognoscenti of any art form. I suspect Carroll has not addressed this issue because he denies 'the medium specificity thesis' discussed above.
The next step in justifying particular film evaluations is to propose standards for how to generate a hierarchy of competing theories of a particular genre or style, which is a notorious conundrum. For my own take on this issue, see 'A Kuhnian Metatheory for Aesthetics' 8 . Proposing and critically examining such metatheories will alone take us beyond an introductory discussion of film evaluation.
To summarize, then, The Philosophy of Motion Pictures is a useful compendium of Professor Carroll's preoccupations, although it should not be taken as a representative general introduction to the burgeoning field of the philosophy of film. His overly cognitive approach to issues of cinematic affect and evaluation is questionable, but he is convincing in his defense of film as art, and of a naturalistic analysis of the shot, of cinematic sequences and of narrative.
